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NO HARM, NO FOUL? 
“ATTEMPTED” INVASION OF PRIVACY AND THE 
TORT OF INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION 
Eli A. Meltz* 
 
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion protects individuals from unwanted 
invasions into their personal space and personal affairs.  While courts 
differ as to the precise definition and scope of this tort, at the most basic 
level, a claim for intrusion upon seclusion alleges that the defendant has 
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s legitimate interest in 
maintaining some degree of privacy in his or her personal affairs.  This 
Note analyzes an interesting issue that has emerged concerning the 
application of this tort:  Should a defendant be held liable when he or she 
has attempted to observe the plaintiff in a private setting but is ultimately 
unsuccessful? 
Some courts have held that the mere placement of surveillance equipment 
that is capable of transforming a private space into a public one constitutes 
an intrusion, even if the defendant never uses the device to view or hear the 
plaintiff.  Other courts, however, have held that the plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant overheard, viewed, or otherwise observed the plaintiff using 
the device.  This Note analyzes the underlying basis and purpose of the 
intrusion tort and argues that a plaintiff should not need to prove that the 
defendant actually used the device to see or hear the plaintiff—in other 
words, the placement alone of surveillance equipment is an invasion of the 
plaintiff’s privacy and should be sufficient to state a claim for intrusion 
upon seclusion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On November 3, 2014, Aksana Kutzmitskaya filed a complaint in New 
York State Supreme Court alleging that her former employers, two 
managing members and supervisors of a Manhattan apartment building 
where she lived and worked, installed spy cameras in her apartment without 
her consent.1  According to the complaint, these cameras, which the 
defendants placed in Ms. Kutzmitskaya‘s bedroom and bathroom, allowed 
them to view her performing highly personal and private activities, 
including showering, using the bathroom, and engaging in sexual activity, 
through a wireless feed transmitted to one of their computers.2  The 
complaint alleged that the defendants made at least seventy videos of Ms. 
Kutzmitskaya, all without her knowledge or consent, and that she suffered 
humiliation and emotional distress from learning about the secret tapes.3  
 
 1. See Complaint at 2–3, Kutzmitskaya v. 7 W. 82 LLC, No. 160918/2014 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Nov. 3, 2014); see also Ben Yakas, UWS Maid Sues Bosses for Spying on Her with 
Hidden Cameras, GOTHAMIST (Nov. 6, 2014, 5:02 PM), http://gothamist.com/2014/11/06/ 
uws_maid_sues_landlords_for_spying.php. 
 2. See Complaint, supra note 1, at 4. 
 3. See id. 
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The complaint further averred that the defendants invaded the plaintiff‘s 
privacy by intruding upon her seclusion, among other claims.4 
Although the complaint stated that the spy cameras were fully 
operational and that the defendants made and watched the secret 
recordings,5 assume for a moment that the defendants never watched the 
recordings because they were accidentally deleted before they could be 
viewed.  Assume further that the cameras had subsequently stopped 
working, thereby precluding the possibility of future recordings.  Finally, 
assume that Ms. Kutzmitskaya discovers the hidden cameras (believing that 
the defendants had been watching her this whole time) and sues for 
invasion of privacy, alleging that the defendants intruded upon her 
seclusion by placing the cameras in her apartment without her consent.  The 
defendants argue that they cannot be held liable for invasion of privacy 
because they never viewed Ms. Kutzmitskaya using the hidden cameras, 
which have since stopped working.  Who should prevail? 
The answer to this seemingly straightforward but deceptively complex 
question depends on which state‘s privacy law is applied.6  Some states 
have held that the placement of a camera or other recording device where 
the plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy is actionable even 
without anyone else seeing or viewing the plaintiff with the device.7  Other 
states have taken the view that someone else must actually see, hear, or 
observe the plaintiff to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion; in other 
words, there must be acquisition of information about the plaintiff.8 
Although this conflict is not a new development, it is increasingly 
relevant in modern society as recording devices like camera phones become 
ubiquitous and as notions of privacy adapt to technological advances.9  For 
example, should a plaintiff be able to recover if he or she discovers a 
dummy camera10 in a place where he or she has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy?  If the court requires actual observation of the plaintiff to state a 
claim, then the plaintiff would be precluded from any intrusion upon 
seclusion–based recovery, no matter how offensive the conduct in 
question.11  In addition, this conflict concerns fundamental questions about 
the nature of the injury for which the intrusion tort provides a remedy:  Is 
the plaintiff injured when she unexpectedly discovers a hidden camera in 
 
 4. See id. at 10. 
 5. See id. at 4, 8. 
 6. See 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION:  LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED 
PROBLEMS § 12:6, at 12-96 (4th ed. 2010 & Supp. 2014) (noting that the answer to this 
question is ―a matter of some dispute‖). 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. See, e.g., Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet:  A Tort 
Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1017–25 (1995) 
(describing technological advances that pose threats to privacy concerns). 
 10. A dummy camera is a ―fake‖ camera that gives the appearance of functioning but 
does not actually work. 
 11. See, e.g., Meche v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 692 So. 2d 544, 547 (La. Ct. App. 1997) 
(holding that the plaintiffs had not stated an invasion of privacy claim because they had not 
met their burden of proving that they were recorded and viewed). 
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her bedroom that, for whatever reason, never records her, or is there an 
injury only when someone else observes her using the hidden camera?12 
This Note seeks to answer this challenging question.  Part I outlines the 
common law and statutory recognition of privacy as it has developed in the 
several states, focusing particularly on the intrusion upon seclusion branch 
of the privacy tort.  Part II provides an overview of cases from different 
jurisdictions that have decided whether an intrusion without acquisition of 
information about the plaintiff is actionable.  Lastly, Part III argues that 
acquisition of information should not be required to state a claim and 
proposes a standard for future cases. 
I.   THE DEVELOPMENT AND RECOGNITION OF INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Part I of this Note describes the right of privacy, with particular emphasis 
on intrusion upon seclusion.  Part I.A focuses on the historical development 
of the privacy torts.  Part I.B explains the three sources of the right of 
privacy in the United States:  the common law, the U.S. Constitution, and 
state and federal statutes.  Part I.C provides an overview of the elements 
and recognition of intrusion in the fifty states and then gives a comparative 
analysis of different states‘ decisions and required elements of an intrusion 
claim.  Part I.D discusses the rationales and purposes of the intrusion tort 
according to scholars. 
A.   History and Development of the Right of Privacy 
In what is one of the most influential legal articles ever written,13 Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis set forth the conceptual basis for modern 
privacy law.14  Warren and Brandeis argued that just as the law had come to 
recognize the protection against bodily injury (battery), protection against 
attempts to cause bodily injury (assault), and protection against offensive 
noises and odors (nuisance), so, too, should the law recognize a person‘s 
 
 12. See Koeppel v. Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Iowa 2011) (―The point of 
disagreement among courts across the nation essentially boils down to whether the harm 
sought to be remedied by the tort is caused by accessing information from the plaintiff in a 
private place or by placing mechanisms in a private place that are capable of doing so at the 
hand of the defendant.‖). 
 13. See, e.g., Howard v. Antilla, 294 F.3d 244, 247–48 (1st Cir. 2002) (―It is rare that the 
pedigree of a whole breed of common law tort claims can be traced with pinpoint accuracy.  
But in the case of common law claims for invasion of the right of privacy, most sources 
agree that the broad contours of these legal theories were first outlined by Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis in the pages of the Harvard Law Review.‖); RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & 
ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW 38 (2d ed. 2002) (―It is likely that the Warren and Brandeis 
article has had as much impact on the development of law as any single publication in legal 
periodicals.‖); Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the 
Birth of the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 624 (2002) (―The citation alone is a 
ubiquitous one in privacy law circles and familiar to most lawyers or scholars whose work 
has touched on the law‘s protections of privacy.‖). 
 14. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
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right ―to be let alone.‖15  The authors suggested that property law is not a 
sufficient basis to protect the right to keep one‘s ―thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions‖ private, whether they are expressed in a personal diary or 
constitute a literary masterpiece.16  Instead, it is ―the more general right of 
the individual to be let alone‖ that protects the publication of these personal 
expressions, especially when expressed in personal letters, for example, and 
not in an artistic work where there is potential for profits from their 
production and where property law can provide protection from 
publication.17 
The first major case to decide the issue after the Warren and Brandeis 
article18 was Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,19 decided by the New 
York Court of Appeals in 1902.  In Roberson, the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant violated her right of privacy by using a picture of her without 
consent on advertisements for its flour.20  Finding that there was no 
recognition of the right of privacy in prior decisions, the court refused to 
recognize a common law right of privacy in New York.21  Three years later, 
however, the Supreme Court of Georgia unanimously reached the opposite 
conclusion in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co.,22 holding that 
the law recognized the right of privacy,23 becoming the first court to 
recognize and affirm the right.24 
 
 15. See id. at 193–95 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 
1888)). 
 16. See id. at 198–205. 
 17. See id. at 205 (―The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal 
productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any 
form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality.‖). 
 18. DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 1:1, at 1-4 (2002 & Supp. 2014) (noting that 
Roberson was the first major case to confront the question of whether to recognize a cause of 
action for invasion of privacy). 
 19. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. at 447–48.  A dissenting opinion disagreed, finding that the lack of precedent 
recognizing the right was not fatal to the plaintiff‘s case and that New York should recognize 
a common law right of privacy. See id. at 448–51 (Gray, J., dissenting) (―It would be a 
reproach to equitable jurisprudence if equity were powerless to extend the application of the 
principles of common law or of natural justice in remedying a wrong, which, in the progress 
of civilization, has been made possible as the result of new social or commercial 
conditions.‖).  Because of the negative reaction surrounding the Roberson decision, the New 
York legislature passed a statute in 1903 that, in its current form, permits recovery when 
one‘s ―name, portrait, picture or voice is used . . . for advertising purposes or for the 
purposes of trade.‖ N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009); see also Neil M. Richards 
& Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law:  A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1893 
(2010) (noting that the ―popular outcry‖ against Roberson led the legislature to pass the 
privacy tort statute). 
 22. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
 23. See id. at 80–81 (―So thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes, within 
proper limits, as a legal right, the right of privacy . . . that we venture to predict that the day 
will come that the American bar will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained by 
judges of eminence and ability . . . .‖). 
 24. See JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY 17 (1997).  In reaching its 
decision, the court relied on a theory of rights known as natural law, which recognizes that 
certain individual rights derive from nature and not just from positive rules and principles set 
forth by judges and legislatures. See id.; TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 13, at 58. 
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The next major step in the history of the development of the right of 
privacy was William L. Prosser‘s 1960 article in the California Law 
Review.25  By the time of his article, a majority of American courts had 
come to recognize the right of privacy.26  It was Prosser, however, who 
postulated that the right of privacy was really comprised of four separate 
torts which, except for sharing a common name, had essentially nothing in 
common other than that they each protect the individual‘s right ―to be let 
alone.‖27  For his contribution to the history and development of the law of 
privacy, Prosser has been called the ―chief architect‖ of privacy law.28 
In his article, Prosser outlined the four branches of the privacy tort: 
1.  Intrusion upon the plaintiff‘s seclusion or solitude, or into his private 
affairs. 
2.  Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3.  Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
4.  Appropriation, for the defendant‘s advantage, of the plaintiff‘s name or 
likeness.29 
These four branches of the privacy tort were later incorporated into the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts,30 for which Prosser was the chief reporter.31  
It is difficult to overstate the impact of Prosser‘s article, as courts have 
continued to apply the four branches of the privacy tort that Prosser first set 
forth in 1960.32 
B.   Legal Sources of the Right of Privacy 
This section explores and clarifies the three sources of the recognition of 
the right of privacy:  the common law, the Constitution, and federal and 
state statutes. 
The common law roots of the right of privacy can be traced back to the 
Warren and Brandeis article in the Harvard Law Review, in which the 
authors argued that the common law should recognize the right of 
privacy.33  As a civil wrong, invasion of privacy is properly classified as an 
 
 25. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
 26. See id. at 386; see also Dora Georgescu, Note, Two Tests Unite to Resolve the 
Tension Between the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 
913 (2014). 
 27. See Prosser, supra note 25, at 389 (quoting COOLEY, supra note 15, at 29). 
 28. See Richards & Solove, supra note 21, at 1888 (discussing the influence of Prosser‘s 
article on the development of privacy law in the United States); see also ELDER, supra note 
18, § 1:1, at 1-5 (describing Prosser‘s work as ―enormously influential‖). 
 29. Prosser, supra note 25, at 389.  This Note focuses on the intrusion tort, the first 
branch of the privacy tort enumerated in Prosser‘s article. 
 30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
 31. See Richards & Solove, supra note 21, at 1890. 
 32. See id.; see also West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 642–43 
(Tenn. 2001) (―The protection of privacy rights are still reflected in current law, owing much 
to the efforts of Dean William L. Prosser, whose analysis of invasion of privacy resulted in 
the classification of that tort into four separate causes of action.‖). 
 33. See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text; see also Hill v. Nat‘l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass‘n, 865 P.2d 633, 646 (Cal. 1994) (―The origin of the common law right to 
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intentional tort.34  As most of tort law is made by state judges, state court 
decisions are largely responsible for much of the current state of privacy 
law.35  Tort law is, generally speaking, the basis for privacy rights asserted 
by a private party against others.36  Pavesich37 became the leading case 
recognizing the common law right of privacy.38  This Note is concerned 
primarily with the common law right of privacy and the intrusion branch as 
it has been applied and interpreted by state courts. 
Although the right of privacy is not specifically enumerated in the 
Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has come to recognize ―zones of 
privacy‖ established by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.39  While the common law right of privacy protects 
individuals from the acts of other private individuals or businesses, the 
constitutional right of privacy protects citizens from governmental 
invasions of privacy, such as warrantless searches.40  In Katz v. United 
States,41 the Court explained that the Fourth Amendment prohibits ―certain 
kinds of governmental intrusion,‖ but a person‘s general right to be left 
alone by other people is to be governed by the states.42  Despite the 
differences between tort law and constitutional protections of privacy, it is 
still reasonable to view the interests and values that each protect as 
connected and related.43  Additionally, constitutional privacy cases may 
address similar interests as the common law right, including ―expectations 
of seclusion and [the protection of] very intimate and personal areas of 
 
privacy is often traced to a seminal law review article written at the end of the last 
century.‖). 
 34. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 1–2 (4th ed. 
2012). 
 35. See id. at 1. 
 36. See id.; DECEW, supra note 24, at 18 (―Tort rights are generally held by individuals 
against private persons or businesses.‖). 
 37. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 38. See Prosser, supra note 25, at 386. 
 39. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–86 (1965) (finding that several 
constitutional guarantees, and not just the Fourth Amendment, created a protected right of 
privacy); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712–13 (1976); James W. Hilliard, A 
Familiar Tort That May Not Exist in Illinois:  The Unreasonable Intrusion on Another’s 
Seclusion, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 601, 606 (1999). 
 40. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 392 (1971) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment prohibits certain conduct by a 
federal agent regardless of whether state law would similarly prohibit or penalize the 
conduct if it were done by a private citizen); see also Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a 
Heavyweight:  A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 
298 (1983) (―Whereas the Constitution insulates individuals from governmental intrusion in 
their private lives, it does not dictate rights between private citizens.‖). 
 41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 42. See id. at 350–51; see also Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding 
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search and seizure conducted by a private 
party). 
 43. See DECEW, supra note 24, at 18 (―While some commentators have viewed the 
protection of informational privacy in tort law as distinct from privacy protection under the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, the more common and reasonable view is 
to recognize the link between them.‖). 
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life.‖44  The constitutional right of privacy is not without confusion and 
controversy, owing in part to the range of cases interpreting it and the 
difficulty in attributing its foundation to a specific provision of the 
Constitution.45 
There are many federal statutes that protect privacy.46  Among these 
statutes is the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968,47 also 
known as Title III, which provides a private right of action for anyone 
whose communications have been intercepted without authorization.48  
Other examples of federal statutes concerned with the protection of privacy 
include the Crime Control Act of 1973,49 which protects the privacy and 
confidentiality of criminal justice records,50 and the Right to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978,51 which protects the confidentiality of financial 
records.52  In addition to federal statutes, many states also have enacted 
legislation providing for protection of privacy.53  In New York, for 
example, invasion of privacy claims only can be brought under the privacy 
statute; New York does not recognize a common law right of privacy.54  
Some states also have criminal statutes making it a crime to install 
recording devices in private places without consent.55   
C.   Jurisdictional Overview and 
Comparative Analysis of Intrusion upon Seclusion 
This section first provides a brief overview of the elements of the 
intrusion branch of the privacy tort, focusing specifically on the widely 
adopted Restatement (Second) of Tort‘s formulation.  It then provides an 
analysis of the intrusion branch in all fifty states, focusing on whether these 
jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion, 
whether they do so under common law or by statute, and whether they 
follow the Restatement (Second) of Tort‘s formulation or have adopted 
different standards and elements.  Lastly, this section compares and 
contrasts some of the differences in states‘ applications of the elements of 
an intrusion claim. 
 
 44. Zimmerman, supra note 40, at 298. 
 45. See DECEW, supra note 24, at 21. 
 46. See TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 13, at 72–74 (providing an overview of 
federal statutes protecting privacy).  This discussion highlights a few examples, but there are 
many more. 
 47. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2012). 
 48. See infra Part II.D. 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 3789g (2012). 
 50. Id. 
 51. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012). 
 52. See id. § 3403. 
 53. See infra notes 105–08, 111–12 and accompanying text. 
 54. See infra note 111. 
 55. See infra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. 
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1.   Elements of Intrusion upon Seclusion 
and the Restatement (Second) of Tort‘s Formulation 
In determining their own set of required criteria to state a claim for 
invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion, many courts follow 
the formulation set forth in section 652B of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.56  As provided in the Restatement, ―[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his 
private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of 
his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.‖57  The Restatement provides four explanatory comments.  
Comment a states: 
 The form of invasion of privacy covered by this Section does not 
depend upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded 
or to his affairs.  It consists solely of an intentional interference with his 
interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private 
affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable man.58 
Comment b states that an intrusion need not be physical to be actionable 
(although a physical invasion into an area where the plaintiff has secluded 
him or herself would suffice), and that an intrusion occurs when the 
defendant taps the plaintiff‘s telephone wires or uses some other device ―to 
oversee or overhear the plaintiff‘s private affairs.‖59  Comment c specifies 
that the intrusion must concern something that is private; for example, 
examining information about the plaintiff that is public or taking the 
plaintiff‘s picture when the plaintiff is in a public place, do not constitute 
intrusions into the plaintiff‘s private affairs.60  Lastly, comment d states that 
the interference must be substantial and ―of a kind that would be highly 
offensive to the ordinary reasonable man.‖61  In other words, a landlord 
paying an early Sunday morning visit to her tenant to demand rent payment 
 
 56. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., 435 So. 2d 705, 708–09 (Ala. 1983) 
(holding that Alabama recognizes the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as defined in the 
Restatement); Hill v. Nat‘l Collegiate Athletic Ass‘n, 865 P.2d 633, 647 (Cal. 1994) (noting 
that California follows the Restatement‘s definition of privacy interests); Koeppel v. Speirs, 
808 N.W.2d 177, 181 (Iowa 2011) (―We adopted the definition of invasion of privacy 
recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, including unreasonable intrusion upon 
seclusion.‖); see also infra Part I.C.3.a. 
 57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 58. Id. § 652B cmt. a.  Several courts holding that overhearing or observation of the 
plaintiff is not required to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion have relied upon this 
comment as support. See, e.g., Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); 
Geraci v. Conte, No. 72440, 1998 WL 323564, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 1998). 
 59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b. 
 60. Id. § 652B cmt. c.  This comment notes that even in public places, there might be 
matters that the plaintiff would not expect to be disclosed, such as the plaintiff‘s underwear 
while walking along a public highway (assuming that the plaintiff has not otherwise made 
his or her underwear easily viewable in public), and an intrusion into these matters would 
still be an invasion of privacy despite being in public. See id. 
 61. Id. § 652B cmt. d. 
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that the landlord knows the tenant does not have, while annoying, is not an 
invasion of the tenant‘s privacy.62 
2.   Overview of the Recognition of Intrusion in the Fifty States 
This section provides a survey of the recognition of intrusion upon 
seclusion in the fifty states, whether it is recognized under common law or 
statute, and whether the jurisdiction follows the Restatement (Second) of 
Tort‘s formulation or deviates from the definition of intrusion in section 
652B. 
Currently, the vast majority of states recognize the intrusion strand of 
invasion of privacy either under common law or by statute.  The following 
states recognize intrusion upon seclusion under common law and follow the 
Restatement‘s formulation, either explicitly adopting it or closely mirroring 
the Restatement‘s definition and description of the cause of action:  
Alabama,63 Alaska,64 Arizona,65 Arkansas,66 California,67 Colorado,68 
Connecticut,69 Delaware,70 Georgia,71 Hawaii,72 Idaho,73 Illinois,74 Iowa,75 
Kansas,76 Kentucky,77 Louisiana,78 Maine,79 Maryland,80 Minnesota,81 
 
 62. Id. § 652B cmt. d, illus. 8. 
 63. See Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., 435 So. 2d 705, 708–09 (Ala. 1983). 
 64. See Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1244–45 (Alaska 2007). 
 65. See Hart v. Seven Resorts Inc., 947 P.2d 846, 853 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).  The 
Supreme Court of Arizona initially granted review, but after oral argument and further 
consideration, it vacated its order granting review. See Hart v. Seven Resorts, Inc., 955 P.2d 
534 (Ariz. 1998). 
 66. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 74 S.W.3d 634, 644 (Ark. 2002). 
 67. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 489–90 (Cal. 1998). 
 68. See Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060, 1066–67 (Colo. App. 1998).  The 
Supreme Court of Colorado has indicated that by denying certiorari in Doe, it allowed the 
Court of Appeals‘s recognition of intrusion to stand. See Denver Pub. Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 
893, 897 (Colo. 2002) (en banc). 
 69. The Supreme Court of Connecticut has indicated that it recognizes intrusion upon 
seclusion, but does not appear to have decided an intrusion case or specified the elements. 
See Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 1327–29 (Conn. 1982).  
When evaluating intrusion upon seclusion claims, the lower courts have (in the absence of 
guidance from the Connecticut appellate courts) relied upon the Restatement‘s formulation 
as to the necessary elements to state a claim. See Carney v. Amendola, No. CV106003738, 
2014 WL 2853836, at *17 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 14, 2014). 
 70. See Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1349–50 (Del. 1992). 
 71. See Yarbray v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 409 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 1991). 
 72. See Mehau v. Reed, 869 P.2d 1320, 1330 (Haw. 1994). 
 73. See Hoskins v. Howard, 971 P.2d 1135, 1141 (Idaho 1998). 
 74. See Lawlor v. N. Am. Corp. of Ill., 983 N.E.2d 414, 424–25 (Ill. 2012). 
 75. See Stessman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 686–87 (Iowa 
1987). 
 76. See Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Kan. 1985). 
 77. See McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Ky. 
1981). 
 78. See Parish Nat‘l Bank v. Lane, 397 So. 2d 1282, 1285–86 (La. 1981). 
 79. See Nelson v. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223–24 (Me. 1977). 
 80. See Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 1380–81 (Md. 1997). 
 81. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233–35 (Minn. 1998). 
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Mississippi,82 Missouri,83 Nevada,84 New Hampshire,85 New Jersey,86 New 
Mexico,87 North Carolina,88 Ohio,89 Oklahoma,90 Oregon,91 
Pennsylvania,92 South Dakota,93 Tennessee,94 Texas,95 Utah,96 Vermont,97 
Washington,98 and West Virginia.99 
Decisions from several other jurisdictions indicate that intrusion is 
recognized under common law, but these states have not adopted or have 
not followed the Restatement‘s formulation.  These states are Florida,100 
Indiana,101 Michigan,102 Montana,103 and South Carolina.104 
 
 82. See Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1039 (Miss. 1999).  Mississippi also 
requires that ―the plaintiff must show some bad faith or utterly reckless prying to recover on 
an invasion of privacy cause of action.‖ Id. 
 83. See Sofka v. Thal, 662 S.W.2d 502, 510–11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc). 
 84. See PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1279 (Nev. 1995), rev’d on other 
grounds, City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Hecht, 940 P.2d 127 
(Nev. 1997). 
 85. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1008 (N.H. 2003). 
 86. See Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990 A.2d 650, 660 (N.J. 2010). 
 87. Several New Mexico appellate court decisions favorably refer to the Restatement‘s 
formulation of intrusion and indicate that a cause of action for intrusion exists in New 
Mexico, but none has dealt extensively with an intrusion claim or elaborated on the 
elements. See Moore v. Sun Publ‘g Corp., 881 P.2d 735, 742–43 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); 
McNutt v. N.M. State Tribune Co., 538 P.2d 804, 807–08 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975). 
 88. See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). 
 89. See Sustin v. Fee, 431 N.E.2d 992, 993–94 (Ohio 1982). 
 90. See Munley v. ISC Fin. House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336, 1339–40 (Okla. 1978). 
 91. See Mauri v. Smith, 929 P.2d 307, 310 (Or. 1996). 
 92. See Burger v. Blair Med. Assocs., 964 A.2d 374, 379 (Pa. 2009). 
 93. See Kjerstad v. Ravellette Publ‘ns, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 419, 424 (S.D. 1994). 
 94. See Givens v. Mullikan ex rel. Estate of McElwaney, 75 S.W.3d 383, 411–12 (Tenn. 
2002).  While favorably citing the Restatement and its comments, the court indicated that the 
plaintiff must also prove ―(1) that the information sought by the opposing party was not 
properly discoverable or was otherwise subject to some form of privilege; [and] (2) that the 
opposing party knew that the information was not discoverable or was subject to privilege, 
but nevertheless proceeded to obtain that information.‖ Id. at 412. 
 95. See Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993). 
 96. See Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563–64 (Utah 1988). 
 97. See Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., 624 A.2d 1122, 1129 (Vt. 1992). 
 98. See Mark v. Seattle Times, 635 P.2d 1081, 1094 (Wash. 1981) (en banc). 
 99. See Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 85 (W. Va. 1984). 
 100. Florida appears to have adopted a narrower definition than the Restatement, defining 
intrusion as ―physically or electronically intruding into one‘s private quarters.‖ Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d 156, 162 (Fla. 2003).  The Supreme Court of Florida has also 
indicated that its definition of intrusion is different than Alabama‘s (which has adopted the 
Restatement formulation). See id. at 161 n.3. 
 101. In Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind. 1991), the Indiana Supreme Court 
indicated that intrusion is recognized in Indiana, but a recent district court decision from the 
Southern District of Indiana suggests that the ―scope of the tort of invasion of privacy by 
intrusion upon seclusion remains unsettled in Indiana,‖ that Indiana courts construe it 
narrowly, and that no intrusion cases to date have been proven ―without physical contact or 
an invasion of the plaintiff‘s physical space, such as his home.‖ Lockhart v. ExamOne World 
Wide, Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 928, 948–49 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (citating Curry v. Whitaker, 943 
N.E.2d 354 (Ind. 2011)). 
 102. The Supreme Court of Michigan has indicated that the elements of an intrusion 
claim, as articulated previously by a Michigan appellate court, are ―(1) the existence of a 
secret and private subject matter; (2) a right possessed by plaintiff to keep that subject matter 
private; and (3) the obtaining of information about that subject matter by defendant through 
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Several other states recognize intrusion by statute:  Massachusetts,105 
Nebraska,106 Rhode Island,107 and Wisconsin.108  Utah, while recognizing 
intrusion under common law, also has a criminal statute that is of particular 
interest to this Note.  Utah‘s statute provides that an individual is guilty of a 
privacy violation if he ―[i]nstalls in any private place, without the consent 
of the person or persons entitled to privacy there, any device for observing, 
photographing, recording, amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or events in 
the place or uses any such unauthorized installation.‖109  Michigan has a 
similar statute.110 
 
some method objectionable to the reasonable man.‖ Tobin v. Mich. Civil Serv. Comm‘n, 331 
N.W.2d 184, 189 (Mich. 1982).  This third element is absent from the Restatement 
formulation.  Notably, a Michigan appellate court held just one year after Tobin that a 
plaintiff could state an intrusion claim without proof that information was obtained about the 
plaintiff. See infra notes 242–48 and accompanying text. 
 103. At least two Montana Supreme Court decisions appear to recognize intrusion, 
defining invasion of privacy as ―wrongful intrusion into one‘s private activities in such a 
manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of 
ordinary sensibilities,‖ but neither decision provides much guidance as to the specific 
elements of the cause of action. Rucinsky v. Hentchel, 881 P.2d 616, 618 (Mont. 1994) 
(quoting Sistok v. Nw. Tel. Sys., Inc., 615 P.2d 176, 182 (Mont. 1980)). 
 104. South Carolina recognizes intrusion and its Supreme Court has indicated that it 
consists of a ―wrongful intrusion into one‘s private activities, in such manner as to outrage or 
cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.‖ O‘Shea 
v. Lesser, 416 S.E.2d 629, 633 (S.C. 1992) (quoting Meetze v. The Associated Press, 95 
S.E.2d 606 (S.C. 1956)).  Although the South Carolina Supreme Court does not appear to 
have elaborated on the elements of the cause of action, an appellate court has explained them 
in detail. See Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 6 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989); 
infra notes 192–94 and accompanying text (explaining the elements). 
 105. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (LexisNexis 2011) (―A person shall have a right 
against unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy.  The superior court 
shall have jurisdiction in equity to enforce such right and in connection therewith to award 
damages.‖).  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that the statute covers 
claims for intrusion upon seclusion. See Polay v. McMahon, 10 N.E.3d 1122, 1126 (Mass. 
2014). 
 106. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-203 (LexisNexis 2008) (―Any person, firm, or 
corporation that trespasses or intrudes upon any natural person in his or her place of solitude 
or seclusion, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, shall be liable 
for invasion of privacy.‖).  The Nebraska Supreme Court has relied upon Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 652B and its comments and illustrations in applying the statute. 
See Polinksi v. Sky Harbor Air Serv., Inc., 640 N.W.2d 391, 396 (Neb. 2002). 
 107. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1(a)(1) (2012).  The statute provides that  
[i]n order to recover for violation of [unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion], it 
must be established that:  (A) It was an invasion of something that is entitled to be 
private or would be expected to be private; [and] (B) The invasion was or is 
offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man.  
Id. 
 108. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50(2)(a) (West 2007) (describing that invasion of privacy 
includes ―[i]ntrusion upon the privacy of another of a nature highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, in a place that a reasonable person would consider private or in a manner which is 
actionable for trespass‖).  The statute also states that it ―shall be interpreted in accordance 
with the developing common law of privacy.‖ Id. § 995.50(3). 
 109. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-402(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2012). 
 110. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539d (West 2004). 
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Two states explicitly have refused to recognize intrusion; these states are 
New York111 and Virginia,112 both of which limit recovery for invasion of 
privacy claims by statute and only recognize a cause of action for 
misappropriation of one‘s name, picture, or portrait for commercial 
purposes without consent. 
Finally, two states do not appear to have decided if they will recognize 
intrusion claims:  North Dakota113 and Wyoming.114 
3.   Comparative Analysis of Variations of the Intrusion Tort 
This section provides a comparative analysis of the recognition of the 
intrusion tort, focusing on the rationales and decisions of courts in several 
jurisdictions that define the tort differently and their points of disagreement. 
a.   Restatement Jurisdictions 
While universal agreement does not exist, most states that follow the 
Restatement require the plaintiff to prove the following elements:  (1) an 
intentional intrusion (2) upon the plaintiff‘s seclusion or private affairs in 
which the plaintiff has a legitimate expectation of privacy (3) that is highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.115 
A leading California Supreme Court case, Shulman v. Group W 
Productions, Inc.,116 provides a good overview of the Restatement‘s 
approach.  In Shulman, the plaintiffs—a mother and her son—were injured 
in a car accident on the highway.117  A rescue helicopter soon arrived, 
carrying a nurse, a medic, and a camera operator working for defendants 
 
 111. See Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 703–04 (N.Y. 1993).  The right of 
privacy in New York is governed exclusively by statute—Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 
51—and there is no common law right of privacy in New York. See id. at 703; see also N.Y. 
CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2009) (―Any person whose name, portrait, picture or 
voice is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without 
the written consent first obtained . . . may maintain an equitable action in the supreme court 
of this state . . . .‖). 
 112. See WJLA-TV v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 394 n.5 (Va. 2002).  Like New York, an 
invasion of privacy claim in Virginia must be brought under the Virginia privacy statute, as 
there is no common law right of privacy in Virginia. See id. at 395; see also VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.01-40 (2007) (codifying the misappropriation branch of invasion of privacy).  Because 
there is not much Virginia case law on invasion of privacy claims, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia has indicated that Virginia courts can look to New York decisions in certain 
circumstances as guidance in interpreting its own privacy statute. See WJLA-TV, 564 S.E.2d 
at 395; Town & Country Props. v. Riggins, 457 S.E.2d 356, 362 (Va. 1995). 
 113. See Hougum v. Valley Mem‘l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 816 (N.D. 1998) (refraining 
from deciding whether intrusion upon seclusion is recognized in North Dakota); City of 
Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, Inc., 307 N.W.2d 572, 578 n.3 (N.D. 1981) (―Whether 
or not the tort of invasion of privacy exists under North Dakota law has not been 
determined.‖). 
 114. There do not appear to be any Wyoming cases addressing the issue. See ELDER, 
supra note 18, § 1:1, at 1-7; 1 SACK, supra note 6, § 12:2.2, at 12-12. 
 115. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 74 S.W.3d 634, 644 (Ark. 2002); Mauri v. 
Smith, 929 P.2d 307, 310 (Or. 1996). 
 116. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). 
 117. Id. at 475. 
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Group W Productions, Inc. and 4MN Productions.118  The camera operator 
filmed the rescue on the ground and the subsequent ride to the hospital, 
while the nurse wore a microphone that picked up conversations between 
rescue personnel and the injured mother throughout the rescue.119  The 
footage of the rescue was later broadcast on television without the 
plaintiffs‘ consent, during a documentary show titled On Scene:  
Emergency Response.120  The plaintiffs sued for invasion of privacy, 
alleging that the defendants intruded upon their seclusion by videotaping 
the rescue.121 
The court noted that there were two elements of an intrusion claim for it 
to consider:  ―(1) intrusion into a private place, conversation or matter, 
(2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.‖122 
In order to prove the intrusion element, ―the plaintiff must show the 
defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, 
or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff.  The tort is proven 
only if the plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion 
or solitude in the place, conversation or data source.‖123 
The court held that the cameraman‘s mere presence at the scene of the 
accident itself did not constitute an intrusion because the accident happened 
in a place where the plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy.124  
The court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not have any control over the 
property where the accident happened and could not have reasonably 
expected that members of the media would be prohibited from covering a 
highway accident.125  However, the court held that a jury could reasonably 
find that the plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior 
of the helicopter (as opposed to the scene of the accident itself) or in the 
private conversations with the nurse, which were recorded and overheard by 
the defendants.126 
The court then turned to the element of offensiveness, noting that ―all the 
circumstances of an intrusion, including the motives or justification of the 
intruder, are pertinent to the offensiveness element.‖127  The court 
concluded that the defendants‘ actions could be considered ―highly 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 475–76. 
 120. Id. at 475. 
 121. Id. at 476.  Plaintiffs also sued for invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private 
facts arising from the broadcast. Id. 
 122. Id. at 490. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. at 491. 
 127. Id. at 493.  Factors to be considered in determining offensiveness include ―the 
degree of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well 
as the intruder‘s motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the 
expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.‖ Miller v. Nat‘l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 
668, 679 (Ct. App. 1986); see also Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1421 (E.D. Pa. 
1996). 
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offensive to a reasonable person.‖128  The court held that riding in an 
ambulance with an injured patient and recording otherwise private 
conversations between the patient and the nurse caring for her, could be 
considered highly offensive to a reasonable person.129 
Discussing intrusion specifically, the court explained that ―[i]t is in the 
intrusion cases that invasion of privacy is most clearly seen as an affront to 
individual dignity.‖130  Later in the opinion, when analyzing the element of 
offensiveness, the court similarly referred to ―respect for human dignity‖ as 
a basis for which a reasonable jury might find the cameraman‘s recording of 
the injured plaintiffs during the helicopter ride to the hospital highly 
offensive.131  The court was particularly focused on balancing the public‘s 
legitimate interest in the reporting of newsworthy events (like the car crash) 
with individuals‘ right to privacy, noting that society‘s interest in the 
complete reporting of the news may, in some situations, justify an otherwise 
offensive intrusion, but to a limit and subject to the reporter‘s ―legitimate 
motive of gathering the news.‖132  Ultimately, the court concluded that 
regardless of the public‘s interest in the reporting of the news, the 
techniques used in Shulman reasonably could be found highly offensive.133 
Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc.,134 an Alabama Supreme 
Court case, is also illustrative of the Restatement‘s approach.  In Phillips, 
the defendant, a company providing cleaning, janitorial, and other services, 
employed the plaintiff as an ―overhead cleaner.‖135  Over the course of her 
employment, the plaintiff was repeatedly called into the office of Ray 
Smalley, the company‘s principal owner and president, where he asked her 
if she engaged in oral sex and other highly inappropriate personal questions 
about her relationship with her husband, including how often they had 
sex.136  Smalley also demanded that plaintiff ―engage in oral sex with him‖ 
or she would be fired, and at one point hit her ―across the bottom.‖137  
 
 128. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 494 (quoting Miller v. Nat‘l Broad. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 
1463 (1986)). 
 129. See id. at 494–95 (―A reasonable jury could find that defendants, in placing a 
microphone on an emergency treatment nurse and recording her conversation with a 
distressed, disoriented and severely injured patient, without the patient‘s knowledge or 
consent, acted with highly offensive disrespect for the patient‘s personal privacy . . . .‖). 
 130. Id. at 489. 
 131. See id. at 494 (―A jury could reasonably believe that fundamental respect for human 
dignity requires the patients‘ anxious journey be taken only with those whose care is solely 
for them and out of sight of the prying eyes (or cameras) of others.‖). 
 132. See id. at 493–94.  The court discussed two extremes on both sides of the spectrum, 
first explaining that routine questioning of individuals with information about a story would 
rarely be actionable, while intruding into a private home or tapping a telephone line to 
acquire information would almost always constitute an offensive intrusion, regardless of the 
information sought. See id. at 494; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. 
b, illus. 1 (1977) (describing that a reporter who enters a sick patient‘s hospital room despite 
her objections to take her picture for a news story constitutes an intrusion upon seclusion). 
 133. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 494–95. 
 134. 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983). 
 135. Id. at 707. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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Among other claims, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant invaded her 
privacy by intruding upon her seclusion.138 
After affirmatively adopting section 652B as Alabama law,139 the court 
addressed various elements of an intrusion claim under the Restatement.  
First, the court disagreed with the defendants‘ contention that information 
about the plaintiff must be acquired for an intrusion claim to succeed.140  
The defendants argued that because the plaintiff did not answer Smalley‘s 
inquiries about her relationship with her husband, there was no intrusion 
because no information about the plaintiff was acquired.141  The court cited 
an illustration from section 652B as support for its holding.142  In the 
illustration, a photographer‘s repeated calls made during meals and late at 
night to a woman of ―social prominence‖ seeking that she come to his 
studio to promote his business constituted an invasion of privacy.143  
Similarly, the court held that the lack of acquisition of information about 
the plaintiff‘s private activities did not prevent the plaintiff‘s claim from 
succeeding, concluding that acquisition of information is not required under 
section 652B.144 
Next, the court turned to the question of whether private information 
about the plaintiff must be disclosed or communicated to a third party to 
state a claim.145  Relying on section 652B comments a146 and b,147 both of 
which emphasize that no publication is necessary for an intrusion claim, the 
court held that the lack of communication of plaintiff‘s private information 
to a third party was not fatal to the plaintiff‘s claim.148 
The court then dismissed the defendants‘ argument that section 652B 
requires ―surreptitious‖ behavior in attempting to acquire private 
information about the plaintiff, declining to bar the plaintiff‘s intrusion 
claim simply because Smalley‘s behavior was ―out in the open.‖149 
Lastly, the court addressed the issue of where an intrusion can occur and 
whether only a physical intrusion suffices.  The defendants had argued that 
―there can be no doubt that for the intrusion category of this tort the 
 
 138. Id. at 708. 
 139. Id. at 709. 
 140. See id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, illus. 5 (1977). 
 144. See Phillips, 435 So. 2d at 709 (―We hold that acquisition of information from a 
plaintiff is not a requisite element of a § 652B cause of action.‖). 
 145. See id. 
 146. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 147. Although comment b is primarily concerned with explaining that an intrusion can be 
by both physical and non-physical means, see supra note 59 and accompanying text, it also 
states that ―[t]he intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even though there is 
no publication.‖ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b. 
 148. See Phillips, 435 So. 2d at 709.  The court also distinguished between libel and 
invasion of privacy, explaining that with libel, ―there can be no offense until the contents are 
communicated to another‖ and that ―[t]wo persons are necessary.  One‘s right of privacy, 
however, may be invaded by a single human agency.‖ Id. (quoting Estate of Berthiaume v. 
Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976)). 
 149. Id. at 710. 
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plaintiff must be in a physical place of solitude or seclusion which the 
defendant invades,‖ and an invasion of ―‗psychological‘ solitude‖ did not 
count.150  Relying on comment b, which emphasizes that an intrusion can 
occur not only when the plaintiff has physically secluded himself, but also 
by some ―other form of investigation or examination into his private 
concerns,‖151 the court held that Smalley‘s repeated inquiries into the 
plaintiff‘s sexual behavior and related sexual demands constituted an 
examination into her private concerns and was actionable.152  According to 
the court, to hold that Smalley‘s inappropriate behavior and intrusive 
questioning was actionable in one physical space (i.e., where the plaintiff 
had secluded herself) but not actionable in another (i.e., where the plaintiff 
had not secluded herself) would be contrary to the interest protected by the 
tort.153 
Phillips and Shulman highlight several key elements of the Restatement‘s 
approach to an intrusion claim.  Notably, not all jurisdictions that follow the 
Restatement seem to have given equal weight to section 652B‘s comments 
and illustrations.  Although purporting to follow the guidance of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts in Nelson v. Times,154 the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine held that ―a complaint should minimally allege a physical 
intrusion upon premises occupied privately by a plaintiff for purposes of 
seclusion.‖155  Because the plaintiff in Nelson did not allege a physical 
intrusion (and instead based the intrusion claim on a publication of a 
photograph of the plaintiff without consent), the court denied the intrusion 
claim.156  This proposition is contrary to the holding in Phillips157 and to 
section 652B comment b.158 
The cases discussed provide guidance on several of section 652B‘s 
elements including the highly offensive standard,159 where an intrusion can 
occur,160 and where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy.161  These 
cases also highlight several criteria that section 652B does not require, such 
as disclosure to a third party162 and actual acquisition of private information 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b. 
 152. See Phillips, 435 So. 2d at 711 (―While in some instances physical location may be a 
factor in determining whether the alleged intrusion is actionable, the offensive conduct 
demonstrated by the evidence of record in this case is of such a personal nature that, as 
[p]laintiff suggests, it would be wrongful, and thus actionable, no matter where it 
occurred.‖). 
 153. See id. 
 154. 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977) (citing section 652B‘s definition of intrusion upon 
seclusion and listing the four invasion of privacy branches described in section 652A). 
 155. Id. at 1223; see also Loe v. Town of Thomaston, 600 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me. 1991). 
 156. See Nelson, 373 A.2d at 1223.  The court also noted that the plaintiff‘s complaint 
made no allegation that the photograph at issue was offensive to a reasonable person as 
required by section 652B. See id. 
 157. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977). 
 159. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text. 
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about the plaintiff.163  But what does section 652B mean by ―intentional 
intrusion‖?  The Oregon Supreme Court, which follows section 652B,164 
has stated that this element is satisfied ―if the actor either desires to cause an 
unauthorized intrusion or believes that an unauthorized intrusion is 
substantially certain to result from committing the invasive act in 
question.‖165  In other words, an unintentional or consensual intrusion upon 
seclusion does not exist.166 
b.   Non-Restatement Jurisdictions 
Not all jurisdictions recognizing intrusion have adopted the Restatement 
formulation.  This section will highlight cases from several jurisdictions 
that have adopted different or contrasting standards from many of the 
Restatement jurisdictions. 
Indiana‘s formulation of the intrusion tort provides a stark contrast to the 
Restatement approach and Phillips, both of which do not limit recovery to 
physical invasions.167  In Indiana, however, intrusion upon seclusion 
requires a physical intrusion, ―as by invading [plaintiff‘s] home or 
conducting an illegal search.‖168  For example, in Munsell v. Hambright,169 
the court held that telephone calls made to the plaintiff‘s employer about the 
plaintiff‘s unstable mental condition did not intrude upon the plaintiff‘s 
seclusion.170  The court noted that the same would be true even if the calls 
had been made to the plaintiff because there was no intrusion into the 
plaintiff‘s physical space.171 
Wisconsin, which recognizes intrusion by statute,172 also deviates from 
section 652B‘s formulation by requiring a physical invasion.  In Hillman v. 
Columbia County,173 the plaintiff, an HIV-positive inmate of the Columbia 
County Jail, experienced various medical problems that required frequent 
hospitalization outside of the jail.174  After one of his hospital visits, the 
plaintiff returned to the jail with a medical file that was opened and 
examined by various jail employees, apparently without his consent.175  
Soon thereafter, the plaintiff realized it had become common knowledge 
among jail employees and other inmates that he had AIDS.176  The plaintiff 
 
 163. See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 165. Mauri v. Smith, 929 P.2d 307, 311 (Or. 1996); see also Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 
A.2d 1375, 1381 (Md. 1997) (citing Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 7 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1989)) (noting that the tort of intrusion requires intentional conduct and 
cannot be committed unintentionally). 
 166. See Mauri, 929 P.2d at 311. 
 167. See supra Part I.C.3.a. 
 168. Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind. 1991); see also supra note 101. 
 169. 776 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 170. See id. at 1283. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 173. 474 N.W.2d 913 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). 
 174. Id. at 916. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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brought suit, alleging that the opening and examination of his medical file 
constituted an intrusion upon his seclusion.177 
Under the Wisconsin privacy statute, intrusion upon seclusion is defined 
as ―[i]ntrusion upon the privacy of another of a nature highly offensive to a 
reasonable person, in a place that a reasonable person would consider 
private or in a manner which is actionable for trespass.‖178  The court 
therefore had to determine if a medical record constituted a ―place‖ within 
the meaning of the statute.179  The court first noted that unauthorized 
examination of a medical record could constitute an intrusion upon the 
plaintiff‘s seclusion or private affairs under section 652B, but that the 
Wisconsin legislature had used the word ―place‖ instead of the phrase 
―solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns‖ 
contained in the Restatement.180 
After consulting a dictionary, the court concluded that the plain meaning 
of ―place‖ is geographical and therefore held that the plaintiff had not stated 
a claim for intrusion because a medical file was not a place within the 
meaning of that term in the statute.181  Interestingly, a district court 
applying Wisconsin law found this reasoning unpersuasive, concluding that 
the statutory language on its face was not limited to a person‘s immediate 
physical environment and could also include one‘s private belongings if 
contained somewhere where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy.182  
The court further noted that the Wisconsin statute states that it ―shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the developing common law of privacy,‖183 
which would ―support[] a reading in accordance with the general common 
law as reflected by the Restatement.‖184 
The Supreme Court of Florida faced a similar issue with its interpretation 
of the word ―place‖ in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ginsberg.185  In Allstate, 
the court considered whether unwelcome sexual contact and sexual 
comments made by an employer to his employee constituted an intrusion 
upon the employee‘s seclusion.186  The court affirmed that under Florida 
law, an intrusion is defined as ―physically or electronically intruding into 
one‘s private quarters,‖187 finding that the tort did not include unwelcome 
sexual contact and offensive sexual comments.188  The court noted that 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. See supra note 108. 
 179. See Hillman, 474 N.W.2d at 919. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (W.D. 
Wis. 2002). 
 183. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50(3) (West 2007); see also supra note 108. 
 184. Fischer, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 928. 
 185. 863 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 2003). 
 186. See id. at 157–58. 
 187. Id. at 162; see also supra note 100 (explaining that intrusion in Florida is more 
narrowly defined than section 652B‘s formulation). 
 188. See Allstate, 863 So. 2d at 162 (―[T]he tort of invasion of privacy was not intended 
to be duplicative of some other tort.  Rather, this is a tort in which the focus is the right of a 
private person to be free from public gaze.‖). 
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―[t]he intrusion to which this [definition] refers is into a ‗place‘ in which 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and is not referring to a body 
part.‖189  A dissenting opinion disagreed, finding that unwelcome sexual 
contact did constitute an intrusion upon an individual‘s solitude or 
seclusion, seeing no rational basis to exclude from the tort‘s coverage this 
type of intrusive behavior.190  The court‘s interpretation of the cause of 
action in Allstate contrasts with that of the Alabama Supreme Court in 
Phillips, where unwanted sexual comments and touching were held to 
constitute an intrusion.191 
South Carolina‘s formulation of the intrusion tort also contrasts with 
section 652B by requiring acquisition of information about the plaintiff.  In 
South Carolina, there are four elements to the cause of action:  (1) an 
intrusion (2) into that which is private, (3) which is substantial and 
unreasonable enough to be legally cognizable and (4) intentional.192  As to 
the element of intrusion, it ―may consist of watching, spying, prying, 
besetting, overhearing, or other similar conduct.  Whether there is an 
intrusion is to be decided on the facts of each case.‖193  Further, ―[i]n an 
action for wrongful intrusion into private affairs, the damage consists of the 
unwanted exposure resulting from the intrusion.‖194  In South Carolina, an 
intrusion was found where an individual placed a videotape camera and 
recorder in his bedroom to film swimsuit models changing in and out of 
swimsuits without their consent while at his house.195 
Although these facts likely would constitute an intrusion under section 
652B as well, South Carolina‘s formulation of the cause of action indicates 
that, unlike section 652B, information must be acquired about the plaintiff 
to be actionable:  the damage is from the unwanted exposure arising from 
the intrusion196 and not from the intrusive act itself, as the Restatement 
indicates.197 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. at 165 (Anstead, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (―I can see no 
rational basis for distinguishing, for instance, between a situation where a defendant is 
alleged to have secretly, and without consent, visually spied upon another person in a state of 
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 191. See supra notes 137, 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 192. See Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 6 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See id. at 4, 8. 
 196. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. a (1977) (explaining that the 
form of invasion of privacy covered by intrusion upon seclusion ―consists solely of an 
intentional interference‖ with the plaintiff‘s seclusion and does not depend on publicity 
given to the plaintiff‘s private affairs); supra note 144 and accompanying text (finding that 
acquisition of information not required to recover under section 652B). 
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D.   Scholarly Rationales and Theoretical Bases 
for Intrusion upon Seclusion 
In their seminal article, Warren and Brandeis spoke of the rights and 
principles of ―inviolate personality,‖198 ―the more general right to the 
immunity of the person,‖199 and ―the more general right of the individual to 
be let alone.‖200  According to two scholars, ―[t]he core theoretical concepts 
and assumptions that are employed in the article view privacy as a 
condition and right that is essentially tied to human dignity, the principle of 
equal respect for persons, and the notion of personhood itself.‖201 
Referring to the intrusion branch, Prosser wrote in his famous article that 
―[i]t appears obvious that the interest protected by this branch of the tort is 
primarily a mental one.‖202  Prosser also noted the different interests 
protected by intrusion and several of the other branches of the privacy 
tort.203  Discussing public disclosure of private facts,204 Prosser explained 
that ―[t]his branch of the [privacy] tort is evidently something quite distinct 
from intrusion.  The interest protected is that of reputation, with the same 
overtones of mental distress that are present in libel and slander.‖205  
Similarly, Prosser noted that the interest protected by false light,206 like that 
of public disclosure of private facts, is ―clearly that of reputation, with the 
same overtones of mental distress as in defamation.‖207  Other scholars also 
have emphasized the reputational harm that can result from the public 
disclosure of private facts or affairs and the interest the disclosure branch 
has in protecting one‘s reputation.208  Thus, there are several torts that 
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1805, 1811–14 (2010) (providing examples of instances where public disclosures on the 
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protect against reputational harm—libel, slander, disclosure of private facts, 
and false light (where recognized)—and the disclosure branch allows the 
plaintiff to recover where a harmful statement is true and a claim for libel or 
slander would therefore fail.209 
The intrusion tort—unlike disclosure of private facts and false light, 
which both bear a strong resemblance to defamation—is largely an 
extension of the tort of trespass.210  Prosser indicated that at the time of his 
famous article, the intrusion tort ―has been used chiefly to fill in the gaps 
left by trespass‖ and other torts.211  Many courts emphasize the similarities 
between trespass and intrusion,212 and some jurisdictions only recognize a 
cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion if there has been some physical 
invasion.213  Scholars also have emphasized these similarities; for example, 
one scholar has written that trespass and intrusion protect the same 
interest,214 and a similar set of facts may give rise to a cause of action under 
both trespass and intrusion.215 
But intrusion and trespass can be distinguished:  if a defendant enters a 
plaintiff‘s home without consent, reads the plaintiff‘s private papers, and 
takes pictures without causing any damage to the plaintiff‘s property, the 
defendant has committed a trespass but also has invaded the plaintiff‘s 
privacy by intruding upon the plaintiff‘s seclusion.216  The intrusion tort 
extends trespass by allowing the plaintiff to recover even if the defendant 
has not physically invaded the plaintiff‘s property by, for example, taking a 
picture with a high-powered camera.217  While not every trespassory 
invasion is an intrusion upon seclusion, and an intrusion has been found 
where the plaintiff has no protected property interest, these two torts both 
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enforce the notion that individuals have a strong interest in the ―protection 
of personal integrity.‖218 
Thus, like trespass, the intrusion tort protects a ―safe zone,‖ a ―private 
realm‖ where individuals can be free from the unwanted intrusions of 
others.219  The law has recognized the importance of protecting one‘s 
private space and one‘s home for a long time, and the intrusion branch is a 
more recent development that extends this recognition.220  Just as harm 
from a trespass can occur even when no damage is done to the plaintiff‘s 
land,221 the harm from an intrusion occurs even when no information is 
acquired because the intrusive act itself, the conduct that invades one‘s 
space or disrupts one‘s daily activities, takes away from one‘s interest in 
being left alone.222  Simply put, ―intrusion interrupts one‘s activities 
through the unwanted presence or activities of another person.‖223 
Edward J. Bloustein authored a well-known response to Prosser four 
years after Prosser‘s article was published, disagreeing in large part with 
Prosser‘s formulation of the interests protected by the privacy torts.224  He 
noted not only that mental distress did not appear to be the basis for the 
cause of action in the intrusion cases cited by Prosser, but also that even 
when the plaintiffs did allege mental distress, the court specifically 
indicated that such distress was not a necessary element of the cause of 
action.225  Bloustein proposed that the ―gist of the wrong‖ is the ―blow to 
human dignity,‖ and not mental distress.226  Activities like listening to 
another‘s conversations without consent or entering another‘s home at will, 
detract from the ―human dignity‖ of those whose privacy is invaded in these 
instances.227 
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II.   DOES INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION REQUIRE THAT 
THE DEFENDANT OBSERVE OR OVERHEAR THE PLAINTIFF? 
This part of the Note turns to the conflict at issue:  whether proof of 
observation or acquisition of information about the plaintiff is a necessary 
component of an intrusion upon seclusion claim.  Part II.A describes many 
of the cases holding that an intrusion can occur when the plaintiff is not 
viewed or observed, while Part II.B sets forth the cases that have taken the 
opposite approach.  Part II.C gives a detailed explanation of one particular 
state‘s approach, whose highest court in 2011 set forth a detailed standard 
after careful consideration of the issue.  Lastly, Part II.D includes a 
discussion of Title III and the requirements to recover under the Wiretap 
Act, which provides for a private right of action against unauthorized 
wiretapping and has an underlying rationale similar to the intrusion tort. 
A.   No Human Observation Is Necessary to Constitute Intrusion 
This section provides an overview of the cases holding that a cause of 
action for intrusion upon seclusion exists even if the defendant has not 
viewed, recorded, heard, or otherwise observed the plaintiff—that is, the 
placement of a recording device alone is sufficient. 
The seminal case supporting this approach is Hamberger v. Eastman,228 
decided by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in 1964.  In Hamberger, 
the plaintiffs, a couple renting and living in a house owned by the defendant 
(their landlord), alleged that the defendant invaded their privacy by placing 
a listening and recording device in their bedroom without their consent and 
knowledge.229  The court held that the landlord‘s conduct constituted an 
intrusion upon seclusion regardless of whether anyone listened to or heard 
any noise coming from the plaintiffs‘ bedroom.230  The court noted that 
―[t]he tort of intrusion upon the plaintiffs‘ solitude or seclusion does not 
require publicity and communication to third persons,‖ and that the 
potential for overhearing created by the device ―impairs the mental peace 
and comfort of the individual.‖231  According to the court, ―[i]f the peeping 
Tom, the big ear and the electronic eavesdropper . . . have a place in the 
hierarchy of social values, it ought not to be at the expense of a married 
couple minding their own business in the seclusion of their bedroom.‖232 
The Supreme Court of California confronted the issue in 2009 in 
Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc.233 and held that the plaintiffs need not prove 
they were ever recorded or viewed to establish an intrusion.234  In 
Hernandez, the plaintiffs brought an invasion of privacy suit against their 
employer, which operated a residential center for neglected and abused 
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children.235  The plaintiffs discovered a hidden camera that had been set up 
in their office without their consent.236  The defendant emphasized that the 
camera never recorded the plaintiffs (and was not installed with that 
intention), but instead it had been set up to monitor a computer in the 
plaintiffs‘ office because there was reason to believe someone other than 
the plaintiffs was accessing pornographic material on the computer at 
night.237  The defendant further testified that while the camera was fully 
operational and capable of recording the plaintiffs in their office at any 
time,238 he never activated the system while the plaintiffs were in their 
office (which was necessary to make the camera record and display an 
image on the monitor to which it was connected), and that he only activated 
the system once the plaintiffs had left work for the day.239 
Despite evidence that the camera never recorded the plaintiffs and that 
the defendant never used the camera to view the plaintiffs, the court found 
that there was an intrusion, rejecting the defendant‘s argument that there 
could only be an intrusion if the plaintiffs had been observed.240  The court 
further noted that the installation of the camera, which was fully operable 
and completely capable of recording the plaintiffs at any time if activated, 
was done without the plaintiffs‘ knowledge and was a clear violation of 
their expectation to be free from their employer‘s intrusion in their 
office.241 
In Harkey v. Abate,242 the plaintiff and her daughter visited the 
defendant‘s roller skating rink and used the women‘s restroom while on the 
premises.243  Subsequently, the plaintiff learned of the existence of see-
through panels in the ceiling that allowed for observation from above.244  
The plaintiff, however, could offer no proof that anyone viewed her or her 
daughter in the restroom.245  The court still held for the plaintiff, finding 
that a lack of proof that the defendant had observed the plaintiff did not 
preclude a judgment for the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff‘s privacy may 
have nevertheless been invaded.246  As the court explained, ―[i]n our 
opinion, the installation of the hidden viewing devices alone constitutes an 
interference with that privacy which a reasonable person would find highly 
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offensive.‖247  The court noted that the issue of whether the panels were 
used was not relevant to liability but could be applicable to a determination 
of damages.248 
In Amati v. City of Woodstock,249 a district court applying Illinois law 
similarly held that proof of observation should not be required.250  In Amati, 
police department personnel sued for invasion of privacy, alleging that the 
defendants (the chief of police and the city itself) had taped telephone calls 
made on a line at the police station that was supposedly private and left 
untapped for personal calls.251  The defendants argued that the plaintiffs 
could not prove that their calls were listened to (with the exception of one 
specific conversation involving only two of the many plaintiffs), and that 
this defeated their invasion of privacy claim.252  Noting that the issue was 
previously undecided in Illinois, the court held that proof that someone 
listened to the telephone conversations was not required, and that the 
reasoning in Hamberger253 should prevail in Illinois.254  As support for its 
conclusion, the court explained that ―[t]he placing of a recording device in 
an area where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy is both intrusive 
and disruptive.  In plain language, it ruins the privacy.‖255  The court further 
noted that ―[i]t is not the information that one obtains from such an 
intrusion that is necessarily tortious, but rather, the fact someone has 
accessed an area reasonably expected to be private.‖256 
In Geraci v. Conte,257 the plaintiff sued the defendants on behalf of a 
class of high school students from Brush High School for invasion of 
privacy, and the court held that the presence of a one-way peephole was 
sufficient to state a claim.258  In the case, the defendants, a former principal 
of the high school and his wife, invited students to their home for 
swimming parties but required that all of the students change clothes in a 
room where the defendant had installed a one-way mirror so he could watch 
them change, unbeknownst to the students.259  The trial court dismissed the 
plaintiff‘s intrusion upon seclusion claim because the plaintiff could not 
prove that the defendants actually spied on the students when they were 
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changing.260  The appellate court reversed, finding that it was not necessary 
for the plaintiff to prove actual spying, and the presence of the one-way 
peephole mirror alone was enough to state a claim for invasion of 
privacy.261  The court explained that its understanding of intrusion upon 
seclusion did not require the plaintiff to allege actual spying, relying on the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652B and favorably citing many of 
the other cases discussed in this section.262 
Similarly, Kohler v. City of Wapakoneta263 holds that the placement of a 
device alone is sufficient to state an intrusion claim.264  In Kohler, the 
plaintiff was a dispatcher at the City of Wapakoneta Police Department who 
sued the former chief of police for invasion of privacy.265  The plaintiff 
asserted that the defendant had placed a tape recorder in a toilet stall in the 
women‘s restroom, and this constituted an actionable intrusion upon 
seclusion.266  The defendant argued that because the recorder had not 
picked up any ―personal noises‖ (and had only recorded sounds like water 
running in the bathroom), the plaintiff could not sustain a claim for invasion 
of privacy.267 
Here, the disctrict court held that the plaintiff‘s privacy was invaded by 
the placement of the device, and that the defendant had intruded into a 
private area despite the plaintiff‘s inability to prove that the tape recorder 
had picked up ―personal noises.‖268  The court also noted that ―[t]he 
invasion consists solely of an intentional interference with the person‘s 
interest in solitude or seclusion,‖ and that an intrusion occurs even when the 
device is not actually used.269 
In Carter v. Innisfree Hotel, Inc.,270 the plaintiffs, a married couple, 
rented a room for a night from the defendant, a hotel.271  While they were in 
the room, the plaintiffs heard noises coming from a wall by the bathroom 
and observed two scratches in a mirror against the wall.272  Upon further 
investigation, the plaintiffs discovered a space behind the mirror and a hole 
in the wall of the neighboring room, leading them to believe they had been 
spied on.273  The plaintiffs, however, were unable to prove that someone 
from the neighboring room had viewed them.274 
 
 260. Id. at *1–2. 
 261. Id. at *3–4. 
 262. See id. at *3. 
 263. 381 F. Supp. 2d 692 (N.D. Ohio 2005). 
 264. See id. at 704. 
 265. Id. at 697–98. 
 266. Id. at 697. 
 267. Id. at 703. 
 268. See id. at 704. 
 269. Id. (quoting Geraci v. Conte, No. 72440, 1998 WL 323564, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
June 18, 1998)). 
 270. 661 So. 2d 1174 (Ala. 1995). 
 271. Id. at 1177. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 1179. 
3458 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
The court held that the plaintiffs did not need to prove the identity of the 
alleged ―peeping Tom,‖ and that an intrusion could still occur without proof 
that the spying device had been used while they were in the room.275  Even 
though a jury could reasonably conclude that there was actual use of the 
spying device, such a finding was not necessary for the plaintiffs‘ claim to 
succeed.276 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reached a similar result on a 
similar issue.  In New Summit Associates Limited Partnership v. Nistle,277 
the plaintiff rented an apartment from the defendant, her former landlord.278  
During the course of renovations in the building, the plaintiff noticed two 
circular marks on her bathroom mirror, which she soon realized made it 
possible to see into her bathroom from the vacant neighboring apartment, 
where the bathroom mirror had been removed because of renovations.279  
The plaintiff sued her former landlord and its agent for invasion of privacy, 
and the defendants countered by arguing that the plaintiff could not prove 
that anyone actually observed her through the holes in the mirror.280  The 
court held that it was not necessary for her to prove that someone had 
viewed her, and it noted that ―[t]he intentional act that exposed that private 
place intruded upon appellee‘s seclusion.‖281 
B.   The Plaintiff Must Be Observed or Overheard 
This section discusses the cases that take the opposite approach to the 
cases discussed in Part II.A and require the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant recorded, heard, viewed, or otherwise observed the plaintiff to 
constitute an intrusion upon seclusion. 
In Meche v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,282 the court held that a camera that 
never recorded the plaintiffs could not be the basis of an intrusion claim.283  
In Meche, the plaintiffs alleged that a loss prevention associate of the 
defendant set up a camera in the unisex employee bathroom to monitor 
employees whom he suspected of stealing merchandise.284  Before the 
camera was fully installed and operational, however, another employee 
discovered the camera.285  Because the plaintiffs were unable to prove that 
the camera ever recorded them (which was further supported by testimony 
 
 275. See id. (―There can be no doubt that the possible intrusion of foreign eyes into the 
private seclusion of a customer‘s hotel room is an invasion of that customer‘s privacy . . . .‖). 
 276. See id. (―There is no need for the Carters to establish that they saw another‘s eyes 
peering back at them through their mirror.‖). 
 277. 533 A.2d 1350 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987). 
 278. Id. at 1352. 
 279. Id. at 1353. 
 280. Id. at 1354. 
 281. Id.  The court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff‘s invasion of privacy claim because 
―[t]here was no proof that the invasion of appellee‘s privacy was committed by any agent, 
servant, or employee of either of the appellants,‖ which was necessary to hold the defendants 
liable for the invasion. Id. 
 282. 692 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
 283. See id. at 546–47. 
 284. Id. at 546. 
 285. Id. 
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from the loss prevention associate indicating it was never properly 
configured), the court found that they had not stated a claim for invasion of 
privacy.286  The court noted that, at best, the plaintiffs had established an 
―attempted invasion of privacy,‖ a tort that was not recognized or known by 
the court.287 
An Oregon appellate court reached a similar result in Oliver v. Pacific 
Northwest Bell Telephone Co.288  In that case, the plaintiff was an employee 
of a lumber company and filed suit against his employer for allegedly 
recording and taping his telephone calls to and from the firm without his 
consent.289  The plaintiff claimed this was a violation of his right to 
privacy.290  The plaintiff, however, was unable to show that his calls 
specifically had been listened to or monitored, despite the existence of an 
apparatus for monitoring phone calls and proof that other employees‘ phone 
calls had been listened to.291  The court therefore found that there was no 
intrusion.292 
Pennsylvania also has confronted the issue and reached a similar 
conclusion:  in Marks v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania,293 the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that another person must overhear a 
private phone conversation to state a claim for invasion of privacy.294  In 
Marks, the plaintiff, an attorney, discovered that the defendants had 
installed a monitoring device on the telephone lines (both incoming and 
outgoing) of the police department.295  The plaintiff sued for invasion of 
privacy, but the court held that he had not stated a cause of action.296 
The court based this finding on the lack of evidence that anyone at the 
police station actually listened to the recorded conversations, and because 
the tapes were reused, no one would ever hear the conversations in the 
future.297  According to the court, a required element of the tort is the 
intentional overhearing of a private conversation by someone not a party to 
that conversation, and without such an overhearing, there is no intrusion.298  
As the court noted, ―the only ear ever to hear appellant‘s communication 
was a mechanical one‖—not a human one—and this did not constitute an 
invasion of privacy.299 
 
 286. See id. at 547. 
 287. Id. 
 288. 632 P.2d 1295 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). 
 289. Id. at 1297. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 1298. 
 292. See id. at 1299 (―We conclude that while the voluminous record in this case makes a 
factual showing of intrusion by defendants on conversations of other employees, there is no 
evidence at all to indicate any intrusion upon plaintiff’s phone conversations.‖). 
 293. 331 A.2d 424 (Pa. 1975). 
 294. Id. at 431. 
 295. Id. at 426–27. 
 296. Id. at 430–31. 
 297. See id. at 431. But see id. at 433 (Pomeroy, J., concurring) (agreeing with the 
majority‘s holding concerning the plaintiff‘s other claims, but taking the opposite position on 
the invasion of privacy claim, finding the Hamberger reasoning the correct interpretation). 
 298. See id. at 431 (majority opinion). 
 299. Id. 
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In Moffett v. Gene B. Glick Co.,300 the court held that an intercom could 
not be the basis of an intrusion claim unless there was evidence that 
someone had overheard conversations using it.301  In Moffett, the plaintiff 
sued for invasion of privacy when an employee of the defendant hid an 
intercom (locked in the ―on‖ position) in an area of the plaintiff‘s office 
where the plaintiff and another individual occasionally had personal 
conversations.302  Addressing the contention that the placement of the 
intercom was an unreasonable intrusion into her private affairs, the court 
held that because there was no evidence that the plaintiff‘s conversations 
were overheard by anyone, there had been no intrusion.303  As the court 
explained, ―while Hall‘s intercom may have made it possible to overhear a 
conversation, no intrusion would have occurred until something was 
actually overheard.‖304 
In LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co.,305 an Ohio appellate court 
reached the same conclusion as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 
Marks306 on similar facts and held that the mere placement of a tap on the 
plaintiff‘s phone, without further proof of eavesdropping, did not constitute 
an invasion of privacy.307  In LeCrone, the plaintiff was in the process of 
obtaining a divorce from her husband and had moved out of their shared 
home.308  Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, her husband had requested that the 
defendant place an extension on her private line at his home, thereby 
allowing him to listen in on her telephone conversations.309  The court held 
that because there was no evidence that the defendant ever overheard any of 
the plaintiff‘s phone conversations, it could not be held liable for intruding 
upon the plaintiff‘s seclusion.310  According to the court, ―the only possible 
act which could constitute an invasion in the present case is the 
eavesdropping itself, and the connection or tap here constitutes only a 
preparation for that invasion of privacy.‖311 
Finally, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Johnson v. Allen312 found that 
the plaintiffs must raise a ―reasonable inference‖ that a hidden camera was 
used to improperly monitor the women‘s restroom,313 despite testimony that 
 
 300. 621 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ind. 1985), overruled on other grounds, Reeder-Baker v. 
Lincoln Nat‘l Corp., 644 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Ind. 1986).  Moffett involved Title VII claims 
related to (but separate from) the invasion of privacy claim. See id. at 266. 
 301. Id. at 284. 
 302. Id. at 256. 
 303. See id. at 284. 
 304. Id. 
 305. 201 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963). 
 306. See supra notes 293–99 and accompanying text. 
 307. See LeCrone, 201 N.E.2d at 538.  Notably, Ohio seems to have reversed its position 
since this case was decided, as two cases applying Ohio law, discussed above, have found an 
actionable intrusion even though the defendant did not view or overhear the plaintiff. See 
supra notes 257–69 and accompanying text. 
 308. LeCrone, 201 N.E.2d at 535. 
 309. Id. at 536. 
 310. See id. at 537–38. 
 311. Id. 
 312. 613 S.E.2d 657 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). 
 313. See id. at 661. 
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the defendant had acknowledged the presence of the hidden camera 
therein.314  In Johnson, the plaintiffs sued the operator of a cold storage 
facility for invasion of privacy when it was discovered that there was a 
camera in the women‘s bathroom.315  Johnson, the facility‘s manager of 
operations and a defendant in the case, stated that he had authority to install 
the camera because of rumors that drugs were being sold on the premises 
and further indicated to employees that he had installed cameras throughout 
the facility to monitor them.316  The trial court denied Johnson‘s motion for 
summary judgment on the intrusion claim.317 
On appeal, the court ruled for the plaintiffs.318  Notably, in addressing the 
defendant‘s argument that there had been no invasion of privacy and that 
the lower court erred by not granting the defendant‘s motion for summary 
judgment, the court focused on whether there was sufficient evidence to 
―raise a reasonable inference that Johnson used the camera to improperly 
monitor the women‘s restroom‖—and concluded that there was—rather 
than focusing on the existence of the device itself.319  Thus, this case 
supports the conclusion that mere placement of a recording device is 
insufficient to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. 
C.   The Koeppel Standard 
In 2011, the Iowa Supreme Court confronted the issue and articulated a 
specific, detailed standard in Koeppel v. Speirs,320 holding that actual 
viewing or recording is not necessary as long as the recording device was 
capable of recording the plaintiff.  In other words, the potential for 
projecting private information is sufficient to state an intrusion claim.321 
In Koeppel, the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant, sued for invasion 
of privacy when she discovered a video camera on a shelf in the bathroom 
at work.322  The defendant alleged that he put the camera there to monitor 
another employee whom he suspected of ―conduct detrimental to the 
operation of his office.‖323  The defendant contended that the camera did 
not function properly and produced only static on his monitor.324  The next 
day, the plaintiff discovered the camera in the bathroom and notified the 
police.325  When the police arrived, the officers tried to make the 
monitoring system function properly but were only able to see a ―foggy‖ 
image on the monitor before it quickly disappeared.326  The plaintiff did, 
 
 314. See id. at 659. 
 315. Id. at 659–60. 
 316. Id. at 659. 
 317. See id. at 660. 
 318. Id. at 661. 
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 320. 808 N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 2011). 
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 322. Id. at 178–79. 
 323. Id. at 178. 
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however, present evidence that the camera was capable of operation with a 
new battery and had successfully operated before in a different area in the 
office.327 
After analyzing cases on both sides of the conflict,328 the court ultimately 
agreed with the Hamberger reasoning, explaining that ―the approach taken 
in Hamberger and its progeny is more consistent with the spirit and purpose 
of the protection of privacy.‖329  While ruling in favor of the plaintiff,330 the 
court articulated a standard for Iowa:  as long as the plaintiff could prove 
that the recording device was capable of functioning, even if it was not 
working at the time that the plaintiff discovered the device and the plaintiff 
was never recorded, the plaintiff satisfied the intrusion element.331 
A mere belief by the plaintiff that the device worked is not enough—
―proof the equipment is functional is an ingredient in the inquiry‖ because, 
according to the court, ―[i]t would be inconsistent with the policy of the tort 
to find an intrusion when the privacy of the plaintiff could not have been 
exposed in any way.‖332  The placement of an inoperable camera might, 
however, be actionable as intentional infliction of emotional distress even 
though it would not give rise to an intrusion upon seclusion claim.333  
Further, it is not necessary that the device is functional at the time it is 
discovered—it is only necessary to show that it was capable of recording 
the plaintiff.334  In the words of the Iowa Supreme Court, ―[t]his approach 
is consistent with Hamberger, Amati, and other cases that find an intrusion 
when the potential for projecting private information existed.‖335 
As support for its standard, the court relied on Prosser‘s 1960 California 
Law Review article and noted that ―the tort protects against acts that 
interfere with a person‘s mental well-being by intentionally exposing the 
person in an area cloaked with privacy.‖336  The court further explained 
that, in its view, the harm from an intrusion occurs when the plaintiff 
discovers the presence of a recording device, even if the defendant never 
actually viewed the plaintiff.337  Additionally, rejecting the argument that 
allowing the plaintiff to recover without proof of recording essentially 
creates a cause of action for an attempted invasion of privacy, the court held 
that ―the act of intrusion is complete once it is discovered by the plaintiff 
because acquisition of information is not a requirement.‖338 
 
 327. Id. at 185. 
 328. See id. at 182–84; see also supra Part II.A–B. 
 329. Koeppel, 808 N.W.2d at 184 (―The secret use of an electronic listening or recording 
device is abhorrent to the interests sought to be protected by the tort.‖ (citing Amati v. City 
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 336. Id. at 184 (citing Prosser, supra note 25, at 392). 
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D.   Requirements to State a Claim Under Title III 
Section 2520 of The Wiretap Act, formally known as Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,339 provides for a 
private right of action for anyone whose communications have been 
intercepted without consent.340  Although this Note is concerned with the 
way courts define and apply the intrusion upon seclusion tort, an 
examination of a few Title III cases provides additional guidance on the 
conflict at issue as Title III draws in part on the intrusion tort for its 
conceptual basis.341  Of particular interest is whether Title III requires 
another individual to overhear a private communication to recover—in 
other words, whether information must be acquired by another person to 
recover as the cases in Part II.B require. 
In Broadway v. City of Montgomery342 the plaintiffs sued the City of 
Montgomery and two police officers under 18 U.S.C. § 2520 for allegedly 
intercepting communications through the use of an illegal wiretap.343  The 
plaintiffs alleged that the officers placed a wiretap on the phone of John L. 
Broadway, who was later charged with drug possession in a separate 
case.344  In affirming summary judgment for the defendants, the court noted 
that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the defendants had actually 
intercepted and listened to the tape from the wiretap.345  The court found 
that the plaintiffs could not recover under § 2520 because the defendants 
had not intercepted any of their communications as defined in the statute.346  
As Broadway illustrates, the mere placement of a wiretap without 
interception of an individual‘s conversation would appear insufficient to 
recover under § 2520. 
However, Awbrey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,347 a Georgia 
district court decision, indicates that the plaintiff may not need to prove 
specific instances of calls being recorded to recover under § 2520.  In 
Awbrey, the plaintiffs, employees of the defendant, alleged that the 
defendant installed wiretaps on workplace phones and recorded the 
conversations, seeking recovery under § 2520.348  The defendants argued 
that the plaintiffs could not prove that any specific calls were overheard 
through the use of the wiretap, and therefore the plaintiffs had not stated a 
 
 339. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2012). 
 340. See id. § 2520(a) (―[A]ny person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is 
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action 
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 341. See GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 215, at 337. 
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claim under § 2520.349  The court found that the plaintiffs did not need to 
show or have knowledge of particular instances of phone calls being 
overheard, because the record clearly showed that the defendants had 
placed wiretaps on the phones, that the taps had been used, and that the 
calls were replayed at various points.350  As long as the plaintiffs could 
prove ―by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant has ‗intercepted, 
disclosed or used‘ plaintiffs‘ ‗wire or oral communication[s],‘‖ they could 
recover.351 
Although the Awbrey court may seem to have required a lower standard 
of proof to recover under § 2520, it still required the plaintiffs to prove that 
their communications were intercepted, disclosed, or used.352  In other 
words, despite evidence that wiretaps had been installed, the placement 
itself of the taps was not sufficient—the plaintiffs still needed to prove their 
communications had been intercepted as defined in the statute.  Broadway 
and Awbrey both appear to indicate that mere placement of a wiretap is not 
enough, but left unanswered is the question of whether the definition of 
―intercept‖353 requires a human ear to hear the communication.354 
The Eleventh Circuit held in United States v. Nelson355 that the aural 
acquisition of a communication occurs where the communication is 
obtained and not where it is ultimately heard.356  This decision supports the 
conclusion that an interception can occur without the communication being 
heard by a human.357  Similarly, Amati involved claims brought under the 
Wiretap Act, and the court held that an aural acquisition could occur even 
when a human does not hear the recording.358  The court noted that the 
policy behind the Wiretap Act is best served by an interpretation of 
―intercept‖ requiring only that the communication be recorded and not 
listened to, as one‘s privacy is affected when private conversations are 
recorded even if they are not ultimately heard.359 
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III.   RESOLVING THE SPLIT:  
WHICH APPROACH SHOULD COURTS FOLLOW? 
 Part III analyzes both sides of the conflict discussed above and argues 
that courts should hold that observation is not necessary to constitute an 
intrusion.  It then proposes a resolution similar that of the Iowa Supreme 
Court in Koeppel. 
A.   Acquisition of Information Should Not Be 
a Required Element of an Intrusion Claim 
Stated simply, proof of acquisition of information about the plaintiff 
should not be required to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion.  As 
Justice Thomas W. Pomeroy Jr.‘s concurring opinion in Marks360 
eloquently stated, ―[t]he tort of intrusion is designed to protect an 
individual, not against what other human beings may know or think of him, 
but rather against the very act of interfering with his seclusion.‖361  To hold 
that acquisition of information should be required to state a claim for 
intrusion is to misunderstand the interest protected by intrusion upon 
seclusion, its resemblance and similarity to trespass, and its distinction from 
public disclosure of private facts and false light.  A plaintiff should not need 
to prove that the defendant used a device to view or listen to the plaintiff to 
recover for an intrusion claim.  To answer the question posed in Koeppel,362 
the placement of a mechanism that is capable of recording the plaintiff 
causes harm to the plaintiff regardless of recordation, viewing, or 
overhearing. 
The intrusion branch of the invasion of privacy tort, unlike the other three 
branches articulated by Prosser, does not bear a close relationship to 
defamation and thus should not require publicity.363  The other branches, 
particularly public disclosure of private facts364 and false light,365 are 
largely concerned with protection from harm arising from the publication of 
something false or private and bear a strong resemblance to the torts of libel 
and slander.366  Unlike libel and slander, however, truth is not a defense to 
public disclosure of private facts,367 and the disclosure branch has therefore 
provided a viable cause of action to a plaintiff who could not recover under 
libel or slander.368  As Prosser and others have articulated, both false light 
 
the wiretap.  This would be so even if the individual was assured no one would listen to his 
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 367. See supra note 209 and accompanying text; see also 1 SACK, supra note 6, § 12:4.1, 
at 12-36. 
 368. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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and public disclosure of private facts protect against reputational harm and 
injury to feelings arising from publication.369 
Intrusion upon seclusion, however, is more closely aligned with trespass 
than with defamation.370  A cause of action for trespass does not depend on 
publicity or harm to reputation; the trespassory act itself makes the 
defendant liable because it invades the plaintiff‘s personal space regardless 
of whether information is obtained.371  The same is true for intrusion.372  
Whether it is a physical intrusion, such as a defendant coming onto private 
property and recording intimate activities, or a nonphysical intrusion where 
the defendant uses a camera to take pictures of the plaintiff engaging in 
intimate activities in his or her home,373 the plaintiff‘s ―safe zone,‖ the 
private area where one reasonably expects to be free from intrusion, has 
been violated.374  The harm is not one of damage to reputation or to image; 
it is simply the unwelcome invasion into a private space.375 
Given the nature of the harm that intrusion seeks to protect, it logically 
follows that acquisition of information by another party should not be 
required to state a claim.  Many of the cases discussed in Part II.A 
prudently note that the presence of a recording device alone, regardless of 
whether someone else sees or hears the plaintiff, interferes with one‘s 
interest in being alone and is thus itself an intrusion.376  A private place is 
no longer private when there is the potential that it will be made public by 
means of a recording device.377  This is true even if one is assured that tapes 
of recorded phone calls will be destroyed and never heard—the mere 
presence of a wiretap interferes with privacy expectations regardless of 
whether anyone hears the calls.378  This approach is also consistent with the 
Title III cases holding that the term ―intercept‖ as used in the statute should 
be interpreted to require only that communications be recorded but not that 
they be listened to or overheard by another party.379 
Several states have enacted criminal statutes imposing liability for 
installing a recording device in a private place, regardless of whether it is 
used.380  These statutes express a clear legislative intent to punish mere 
installation regardless of subsequent viewing or listening, recognizing the 
harm that can arise from such an installation.381  As the court in Harkey 
explained, a Michigan criminal statute of this nature (making it a felony 
offense to install a viewing device in a private place without consent) 
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constitutes ―a legislative expression of public policy opposed to such 
conduct.‖382 
The cases discussed in Part II.B that require acquisition of information by 
another person fail to distinguish between the harm from the intrusive act 
itself and the harm from the revelation of the information obtained.383  As 
this discussion has suggested, harm from an intrusive act arises not when 
information is revealed or obtained by someone else, but by the intrusive 
act itself that transforms a private space into one that is no longer private.  
Thus, acquisition of information should not be a required element of an 
intrusion upon seclusion claim. 
Although lack of acquisition of information about the plaintiff should not 
be a defense to an intrusion claim, it is still relevant to a determination of 
damages, as the Harkey court articulated.384  In other words, liability and 
damages should be considered separately:  while still liable for invasion of 
privacy, a defendant could make a strong argument that damages should be 
significantly limited when the defendant never observed the plaintiff.  The 
practical effect of such an argument is that plaintiffs conceivably could 
secure only nominal damages, particularly in instances where the defendant 
never used the device to view or listen to the plaintiff.  And, after all, tort 
plaintiffs seek damages and redress for their injuries, not simply to establish 
that the defendant has committed wrongdoing. 
This argument is not without merit and deserves serious consideration.  
An action for intrusion upon seclusion is closely akin to and bears many 
similarities with an action for trespass, and an action for trespass does not 
require actual damage to the plaintiff‘s property.385  In fact, as explained by 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.,386 the 
harm from an intentional trespass is not limited to damage to the plaintiff‘s 
land but includes the violation of the plaintiff‘s right to exclusive 
possession of his or her property.387  In Jacque, the court upheld an award 
of punitive damages when the defendant, a seller of mobile homes, cut 
across the plaintiff‘s property over the plaintiff‘s objections to deliver a 
mobile home to the plaintiff‘s neighbor, even though the jury did not award 
any compensatory damages.388  The court emphasized that the individual 
landowner and society in general both ―have much more than a nominal 
interest in excluding others from private land,‖ and punitive damages were 
therefore appropriate.389 
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Any argument by a defendant that damages should be limited because the 
defendant never viewed or overheard the plaintiff must be considered in 
light of the Jacque court‘s rationale.  As this Note has suggested, the harm 
from an intrusion is the invasion of the plaintiff‘s private space by any 
device capable of transforming a private space into one that is no longer 
private.  Just as Mr. and Mrs. Jacque had more than a nominal interest in 
excluding others from trespassing on their land, plaintiffs have more than a 
nominal interest in keeping out the unwanted eyes and ears of others, and 
punitive damages may therefore still be appropriate—as they were in 
Jacque—even if the plaintiff was never viewed, overheard, or otherwise 
observed by the defendant. 
B.   A Standard for Intrusion upon Seclusion Claims 
That Adequately Protects Privacy 
Having argued that proof of another person seeing or hearing the plaintiff 
should not be a required element of an intrusion claim, this section proposes 
a workable standard that is consistent with the interest protected by this 
branch of the privacy tort and the rationales attributed to intrusion by both 
scholars and courts. 
In constructing a workable standard, there are several determinations to 
make.  First, must the device be capable of functioning (that is, capable of 
actually recording the plaintiff), or is it sufficient that the plaintiff 
reasonably believed that the device worked (even if that belief were 
mistaken)?  The court in Koeppel required proof that the device could be 
operational and noted that a belief by the plaintiff alone that the device was 
functional, without further proof that it could in fact transmit or record, was 
not enough.390  According to the court, if it was not possible for the device 
to function, then the plaintiff‘s privacy could not have been invaded.391  
This Note proposes that Koeppel‘s conclusion concerning the functionality 
of the device should be the correct standard.  If the device could not have 
worked at all, there could be no invasion of privacy; the private space could 
never have been made public.  As the court in Koeppel noted, such conduct 
might give rise to an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
but should not constitute an intrusion upon seclusion.392 
Next, must the device be operational when it is discovered, or is it 
sufficient that the device functioned at any time after being installed?  
According to the court in Koeppel, the device does not need to be working 
when it is discovered—it only needs to have been capable of recording the 
plaintiff.393  This, too, should be the correct view.  It should not matter 
whether the device is functioning at the time it is discovered, as long as it 
was fully capable of exposing the plaintiff at some point in time after 
installation. 
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Furthermore, a defendant who installs a camera or other mechanism that 
turns a private space into a public one should not get a windfall just because 
the plaintiff happened to not be physically present when the device was 
fully operational and activated.  Every individual has a reasonable 
expectation that he or she can go about his or her private affairs without 
intrusion, and this expectation is violated regardless of whether the plaintiff 
is present.394  Consider the following hypothetical:  presume that Jackson 
and Abbey are next-door neighbors.  Jackson decides to place a camera in 
Abbey‘s living room and breaks into her house to set up the camera.  When 
operated, the camera produces a live stream of Abbey‘s living room to 
Jackson‘s laptop.  To his dismay, however, Jackson mistakenly configures 
the camera such that it only records in the middle of the night, when Abbey 
is sound asleep in her bedroom.  After a week, Abbey sees the camera in 
her living room and confronts Jackson about it.  Jackson sheepishly 
explains that he installed the camera to spy on her, but that he never viewed 
her using the camera because it only recorded late at night, when she was in 
her bedroom. 
In this situation, Abbey should be able to recover for invasion of privacy.  
It should not matter that she was never present when the camera was 
recording, because Jackson‘s camera nevertheless provided a window into 
Abbey‘s private living room and was completely capable of exposing her.  
Had Abbey been unable to sleep one night and decided to watch television 
in her living room, the spy camera would have recorded her and Jackson 
would have been able to observe Abbey in her private space at his leisure.  
Jackson should not benefit because Abbey never made any late night 
excursions into her living room while his camera was set up. 
This view is also consistent with that of the Supreme Court of California 
in Hernandez.395  In that case, the court held that there was an intrusion into 
the plaintiffs‘ privacy when the defendant installed surveillance cameras in 
the plaintiffs‘ office, even though the cameras were never activated when 
the plaintiffs were present and were only actively recording when they were 
absent.396  As the court noted, ―[p]laintiffs presumably would have been 
caught in the camera‘s sights if they had returned to work after hours.‖397  
The exact same is true if Abbey had come home late one night, while the 
camera was recording, and walked through her living room en route to her 
bedroom.  The fact that a plaintiff is not physically present when the device 
is functioning (that is, when the device is recording or otherwise providing 
a window into a private space) should not be determinative in whether an 
intrusion has occurred. 
Lastly, there is the related issue of when the plaintiff must become aware 
of the presence of the recording device.  The fact that the plaintiff is not 
contemporaneously aware of the presence of the recording device or spy 
mechanisms should be of no import.  If, for example, the defendant tells the 
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plaintiff that he placed a microphone in her bathroom two days ago, but has 
since removed it, it should not matter that the plaintiff did not know of the 
existence of the device until after it was removed.  The plaintiff‘s interest in 
being alone in her bathroom without the unwanted virtual presence of 
another individual potentially overhearing her still has been violated, even 
if nothing was ever overheard.  It is important to note, however, that the 
device must have been capable of functioning.  It is not sufficient that the 
defendant tells the plaintiff that he installed a microphone in her bathroom 
two days ago, has since removed it, but that the microphone was broken and 
never worked.  In that case, the potential for turning a private space into a 
public space never existed, and thus there is no invasion of privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
The right of privacy is not absolute.  One‘s general right of privacy must 
be balanced against other interests, and claims for invasion of privacy will 
succeed only where there is an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy that was violated.  A public figure who has willingly made herself 
an object of the public‘s interest has a more limited right of privacy than 
does a recluse who never leaves his apartment.  These limitations on the 
right of privacy are well established in privacy law. 
But everyone has a reasonable expectation that private spaces will not be 
unknowingly intruded upon; the law has long recognized the notion that 
one‘s home is one‘s castle.  When a recording device like a spy camera is 
installed in a private place, be it a workplace bathroom or a home, there is 
an invasion of privacy.  The mere placement of a device that is capable of 
transforming a private space into a public space intrudes upon seclusion, 
even if no other human uses that device to view, hear, or observe the 
plaintiff in that space. 
This Note argues that the standard adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court in 
Koeppel provides a workable solution that is consistent with the harm the 
intrusion tort seeks to avoid.  The placement of a camera, microphone, one-
way mirror, intercom, or any other mechanism capable of transforming 
what reasonably appears as a private space into a public one intrudes upon 
one‘s solitude, regardless of whether another individual actually sees, hears, 
or otherwise observes the person whose private space has been invaded. 
 
